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Abstrnct:
This paper reconsiders the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning and
argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of Subgame-perfectness.
Such a refinement is offered through an analysis based on Greenberg's 'theory of social
situations'. A unifying framework is presented whereby consistent planning as a
requirement for individual time consistency and renegotiation-proofness as a require-
ment for collective time consistency are captured through the same general concept.
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The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the problem of consistent planning
which was raised by Strotz (1955-56) and Pollak (1968). It will be argued that a
solution to this problem as originally posed requires a refinement of Subgame-
perfectness. Through an analysis based on Greenberg's (1990) theory of social
situations such a refinement will be offered.
Strotz (1955~6) and Pollak (1968) were concerned with an individual decision
maker wishing to revise an initially optimal plan if there at some later point in time is
a better plan available. The recent literature on renegotiation-proofness in repeated
games (see Section 6 for references) is concerned with the grand coalition collectively
wishing to revise a Subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) if there in some subgame is a
Pazeto-dominating SPE available. A unifying framework encompassing both individual
and collective time consistency will be presented.
Section 2 will motivate the subsequent analysis by azguing conceptually and
illustrating through examples that Subgame-perfectness dces not solve the Strotz-
Pollak problem of consistent planning. Section 3 introduces the general model, while
Section 4 applies this model to garnes with perfect information. It is established under
what conditions having at each node the active player suggest a path~profile~SPE in
the remaining subgame is equivalent to Greenberg's (1990) notion of optimistic
stability in the tree situation. Based on this equivalence result a solution to the Strotz-
Pollak problem of consistent planning is presented in Section 5, and compared in
Section 7 to a solution to the problem of consistent planning suggested by Kocherlakota
(1991). Section 6 relates individual and collective time consistency, while Section 8
asks whether planning by a single individual with time inconsistent preferences differs
from a game where different individuals make decisions at different times. The relation
of the present analysis - where time consistency requires a refinement of Subgame-
perfectness - to the analysis of macroeconomic policy games - where time consistencyis a weaker requirement than Subgame-perfectness - is discussed in Section 9. Section
]0 contains concluding remarks, while all proofs are relegated to Section 11.
2. TFIF, PROBLF.M OF ('ONSISTF,NT PLANNINC
Consider an individual decision rnaker facing a decision trce. At the initial
node, the individual would like to realize a path through the decision tree that
maximizes the individual's payoff as evaluated at the initial node. Such a path is said
to be optimal. Likewise, a decision rule (defined by the property that it at every node
of the decision tree determines an action) is said to be optimal if it generates an
optimal path. An optimal path (or decision rule) is time consistent if, for each node
reachable by the optimal path, the path (or decision rule) is still optimal in the sense of
maxinuzing thc individual's payoff as cvaluatcd at thc rcached nodc.
Strotz (1955-56) and Pollak (1968) are concerned with the case where there is no
optimal and time consistent path (or decision rule). In such a case, the preferences of
the individual are said to time inconsistent. The following two illustrations are
int'larled in onlrr lo rirovin~~~~ Lhc~ rra~lro~ I,hal. in mal IiG~ smmin,~;ly ral.ional indivirlual
decision rnakers do in fact fac.c such time inconsistencies.
Procrastinntiora. It is a common cxpcricncc LIiaL pcoplc tend to posl,ponc
tmpleasant tasks, preferring to have them done in the next period (day, week, ... ).
Yet, when the next period comes along, still further postponement seems preferable.
Such "... [p)rocrastination occurs when present costs are unduly salient in comparison
with future costs ..." in the words of Akerlof (1991, p.l) who gives the subject an
interesting treatment filled with real-life examples. Hence, at any time, the rate of
time preference between the present and the first future period is greater thau between
a future period and its successor. These are the kind of inconsistent time prejerenceswhich are explicitly analyzed by Strotz (1955-56). Time preferences can be shown to be
consistent if and only if the utility function is strongly recursive in the sense of
Blackorby et al. (1973, Theorem 3).
Intozication. The following situation may also seem realistic: After work, some
would prefer to go by the local pub and have one beer instead of going straight home.
At the pub, after the first beer, it may, however, seem preferable to consume another
three beers. These prefetences are time inconsistent if, when leaving work, going
straight home is preferable to consuming four beers at the pub. Such endogenous
prejerences are treated by e.g. Hammond (1976) who argues that there is no need in a
formal analysis to distinguish between preferences changing exogenously due to the
passing of time (i.e. inconsistent time preferences) and preferences changing endo-
genously due to the actions - e.g. the consumption of alcohol and other intoxica,ting
substances - taken (i.e. endogenous preferences). Both types of time inconsistency are
thoroughly reviewed by Elster (1979), whose terminology I have adopted above.
In the case where there is no optimal and time consistent path (or decision rule),
Strotz (1955~56) suggests two possibilities: Precommitment or Consutent planning.
Precommitment amounts to nothing less than changing the decision tree and will not
be discussed here. The problem of consistent planning is according to Strotz (1955-56,
p.173) for the individual "to find the best plan among those that he will actually
follow".
If no optimal and time consistent path (or decision rule) exists, this problem of
consistent planning requires that the decision tree be turned into an extensive game
where the individual at different times corresponds to separate players. The payoff
that a player receives from a path through the tree equals the payoff the path yields
when evaluated at the reachable node at which this player makes a decision. A
decision rule (as defined above) corresponds to a profile of the players' strategies.
Peleg and Yaari (1973) and Goldman (1980) analyze the notion of consistent
planning in such a game theoretic context. They claim that a plan is the best that willactually be followed ("optimal in the Strotz-Pollak sense", Peleg and Yaari, 1973,
p.345; "a Strotz-Pollak cyuilibrium", Coldmau, 1980, p.~ia4) if and ouly if iL is a SP1~, uf
the corresponding extensive game. The following examples will make it clear, though,
that any SPE is not a solution to the problem that. Strotz (1955-56) posed.
Example 1(see Figure 1) considers an individual who lives at times 1, 2, and 3.
At time 1 he has to decide whether to perform an unpleasant task now (D) or later ((~.
If he chooses U at time 1 he has to decide between now (D) and later ( U) at time 2 as
well. Note that the individual at time 2 is indifferent between U and D: Therefore,
( U, D) is the unique optimal and time consistent pnth since this path is the only one
that is optimal at each node that the path reaches. Following ( U, D) enables the
individual to postpone the unpleasant task from period 1 to period 2. However, the set
of (pure strategy) SPEa is {( U, D), (D, U)}. Hence, there exists a SPE in which the
individual at the initial node dries not chonse the best plan among those t.hat he will
actually follow, rather he receives a lower payoff by performing the task immediately.
Ilc da~ so fcaring thal. if hc txstlwncd thc task aL tirnc 1 hc would txrsttxlnc thc I,ask
at time 2 as well and be worse off as evaluated at the initial node.
0
FIGURE 1Example 2- which is inspired by an example by Asilis et al. (1991) - has the
individual choosing ai E{0, 1} for each i E N with the payoff at time i being given
as min~~a~ In this example there also exists a unique optimal and time consistent
path, viz. (1, 1, 1, ...). Note, however, that (0, 0, 0, ...) is a SPE path since no single
player can profitably deviate from the strategy profile determining the action 0 for
each player at every node. Then, by using (0, 0, 0, ...) as a punishment, any feasible
path can be supported as a SPE path. Hence, even though the problem of consistent
planning has a unique (and trivial since the optimal path is time consistent) solution,
the concept of a SPE has no bite what so ever in this example. (As example of the
same kind, but where the optimal path is time inconsistent is analyzed in Asheim,
1988a. There the optimal and time inconsistent path can be supported as a SPE path.)
These examples are peculiar in the sense that the game of Example 1 is non-
generic, while the payoff function in the game of Example 2 is not continuous at time
infinity. Still, they show that the notion of Subgame-perfectness is not conceptually
valid as a solution to the problem of consistent planning. The reason is the following:
The notion of consistent planning is based on the premise that the players (being
agents of the individual at different times) are symmetric with respect to their ability
to influence later players. In particular, player 1 cannot commit later players to follow
his optimal plan. In a SPE, each player can only reconsider his own action; thus, by
the symmetry requirement player 1 is not the one suggesting or coordinating on a
particular SPE. Hence, by playing according to a SPE the individual is not at any
time doing any planning; instead he is following an exogenously given decision rule
from which the individual does not wish to do single deviations. (Note that considering
an equilibrium as an exogenously recommended course of action is consistent with the
classical view of games; see e.g. Kohlberg and Mertens 1986, footnote 3.)
This discussion - as well as Examples 1 and 2 above - suggests that a
refinement of Subgame-perfectness is required in order to conceptually solve the
problem of consistent planning. Such a refinement will be offered in the subsequentsections through a concept which will turn out to have two equivalent interpretations:
(i) A player can - given that one of his decision nodes has been reached - choose
any palh in the remaining subgame, taking into acwunt that later players can
do so in Lurn.
(ii) A player can - given that one of his decision nodes has been reached - choose
any strategy profile in the remaining subgame, taking into account that later
players can do so in turn.
The concept constructed on this basis respects the symmetry between the decisions
that the individual takes at ditferent times, while allowing him to engage in planning
by choosing "the best plan among those he will actually follow". !t will be established
that this concept yields the set of the optimal and time consistent paths when this set
is non~mpty in every subgame. Examples 1 and 2 satisfy this condition.3. THE GENERAL MODEL
Consider a multi-stage game G where at each stage a subset of the set of
players N:- {1, ... , n} (n finite or infinite) are active in the sense of taking pazt in a
simultaneous-move game in that stage. The game is one of almost perfect information
in the sense that, at each stage, players know all previously taken actions, but not
actions taken by other players in the same stage. In order to capture such a game
define the set of hutories inductively as follows: Let the set of histories in (the first)
period 1 be given as follows: H(1) -{0}. Let H(t) denote the set of histories in period
t. At h E H(t), a subset N~` of N are active. For each i E Nh, the action set at h
is non-empty and denoted by Ah; with Ah denoting the Cartesian product of A~
,
over all i E Nh. Define the set of histories in period t t 1 as follows:
H(ttl) :- {(h, a) ~ h E H(t), N~ ~ 0, and a E Ah}.
For convenience, write (0, n) - a such that H(2) - Ao. This completes the induction.
The set of histories H is now given by: H:- U~~H(t). Note that the game
may have terminal nodes; in fact, it may be 5nite horizon. The set of terminal nodes is
given by: Ho :- {h E H~ Nh - 0}. The set of suógames Fi`HO is naturally ordered by
~, i.e. h ~ k means that h equals or precedes k. Note that - by convention - h( k
is taken to imply that k is not a terminal node.
If h E H, then a feasible path at h, denoted ~r -(a(1), a(2), ... ), is either a
finite sequence of feasible actions leading up to a terminal node (i.e. k- (h, ~r) E Ho)
or an infinite sequence of feasible actions. Define IIh as the set of feasible paths at h.
For notational convenience, write II~` -{0} if h E H0, understanding that (h, 0) - h.
A feasible path R at h yields player i the payoff U~(h, ~r).
Let Rh :- {k ~ h~ i E Nk}. Then the set of strategies for player t E Uk~ANk in
the subgame h- consisting of all x. satisfying for all k E H~, x(k) E Ak - is ~ ~ ~ ~
denoted by Xh. The set of (strategy) prof~les in the subgame h, Xh, is the Caztesian
product of Xh over all í E Uk~hNk. If h ~ k and x E Xh, then denote by xk therestriction of x to the subgame k. Note that Zk E Xk. If h ~ k, then x E Xt`
determines (through the restriction of x to k) a path ak(x) in the subgame k, and
thereby yields player i Lhe payoff U~(k, ak(x)) given that the subgame k has been
mached. I,et uk(x) :- U~(k, ~rk(r.)). fkmote by XF, the set of SPF,a and by IIF, thc
set of SPE paths oí the subgame h. Write IIÉ- {0} if h E Ho. Write X, II, XF„
and IIE for Xh, IIl`, XhE, and IIÉ if h- 0.
The situation which will turn out to integrate the problems of individual and
collective time consistency is given as follows. In each subgame h the players active
at the root of h can choose any SPE in h that is viable when taking into account
that the players active at, the roots of later subgames can do so in turn. In order to
capture this situation, let a standard oj óehavior (SB) for G on SPEa be a
correspondence E assigning to each subgame h E FI`Ho a subset, E(h), o[ X~ A
SB E is said to be optimistic internally stable on XE if
(IS) For any h E I~Ho and any x E E(h), there do not exist k~ h and y E E(k)
such that uk(x) c uk(y) for all i E N'f.
A SB E is said Lo tx~ oplimislic externaUy sf,nble on X~, if
(ES) For any h E II`Ilc and any x E X~,`Z(h), there exist k~ h and y E E(k) such
thaL u~~(x) c u~~(y) for all i E N'F.
A SB is said to be optimislic stable on XE if it is both optimistic internally and
optimistic externally stable on X~, This is a special application of the general notioit
of optimistic stability, which is due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), and
which is a central solution concept in Greenberg's (1990) theory ojsocia! siluations.
The term 'optimistic stability', which has been coined by Greenberg (1990), refers here
to the optimistic attitude of the players active at the root of h in the sense of
believing that they can choose any viable outcome in h. Greenberg (1990) has also a
notion of conservative stability, which does not correspond to von Neumaun attd
Morgenstern stability, and which will not be treated here.4. GAMES WITH PERFEC'I' INFORMATION
A game with perfect information G is characterized by the property that, for
all h E FI`Ho, ~ 1Vt` ~ - 1; i.e., at each stage, only one player moves. Denote by i the
single player active at h. A game with perfect information is a Strotz-Pollak game if (i)
i- 1, and (ii) ih - i and a E Ah imply :~h''1 - itl whenever (h, n) E li`({0}UH~).
A game with perfect information is continuous if for every e~ 0, there exists an
integer K such that if the first ~c nodes of two paths a and p coincide, then for all
i E N, ~ U~(a) - U~(p) ~ c e. A game with perfect information is f~nite action if, for each
h E f1`Ho, ~ Ah~ is finite.
Motivated by Section 2, consider the situations where in each subgame h, the
player active at the root of h can choose
(i) any path at h that is viable when taking into account that the players active at
the roots of subgames that is reached by the path can do so in turn.
(ii) any (strategy) profile in h that is viable when taking into account that the
players active at the roots of later subgames can do so in turn.
Situation (ii) is identical to the one considered in Section 3 with the one differ-
ence that all profiles are considered, not only those that are Subgame-perfect. Hence,
let a SB for G on profiles be a correspondence E assigning to each subgame h E fi`Ho
a subset, Z(h), of Xt`. A SB E for C is said to be oplimistic internally stable on X if
(IS) For any h E fl`Ho and any x E E(h), there do not exist k~ h and y E E(k)
such that uk(x) c uk(y) for i- i.
A SB E for G is said to be optimistic externnlly stable on X if
(ES) For any h E H`Ho and any x E Xt``E(h), there exist k~ h and y E E(k) such
that uk(x) C uk(y) for i- i.
A SB is said to be optimistic stable on X if it is both optimistic internally and
optimistic externally stable on X.Situation (i) is different since it is defined in terms of paths, not profiles.
Therefore, given some path a-(a(I), ... , a(s), ...) E IIh, say that k is reachable from
h through a if k-(h, a(1), ... , a(s)) for some s. Let a SB for C on paths be a
correspondence o assigning to each subgame h E FI`Ho a subset, o(h), of IIl`. An
SB o for G is said to be optimisttic internally stable on II if
(IS) For any h E I~Ho and a E o(h), there does not exist k E II`Ho reachable
from h through ~r and p E a(k) such that U~(h, a) c U~(k, p) for i- i.
An SB a for G is said to be optimistic externally staóle on II ií
(ES) For any h E li`HO and ~r E II~`o(h), there exists k E ll`Ho reachable from h
through rr and p E o(k) such that U~(h, x) c U~(k, p) for i- i.
An SB for G is said to be optimistic stable on II if it is both optimistic internally and
cxtcrnally stablc on I I.
Situation (i) will be shown to be closely related to the tree situation in
Greenberg's (1990, Ch. 8) theory ofsocíal situations. For each kE f~{0}, let P(k)
denote the immediate predecessor of the node k. If a E IIh, then player i is said to be
able to induce k from h through a if i~kl - i and P(k) is reachable from h
through x. Let a SB for C in the tree situation be a correspondence o assigning to
each hístory h E H a subset, o(h), of llh. An SB o for C is said to be oplimislic
internally stable in the tree situation if
(IS) h E H and rr E o(h) imply that for any i E N there do not exist k E H and
p E a(k) such that i can induce k from h through a and U~(h, a) c U~(k, p).
An SB o for G is said to be oplimislic exlernally slable in thc trcc situation if
(ES) h E H and n E IIh`o(h) imply that for some i E N there exist k E H and
p E~(k) such that i can induce k from h through A and U~(h, x) c U~(k, p).
An SB for C is said to be oplimislic staóle in the tree situation if it is both optimistic
internally and externally stable in the tree situation. Greenberg's (1990) tree situatiunhas above been introduced without presenting the generalstructure and terminology of
the theory ofsocia! situations.
Note that a SB on paths ~ for the tree situation assigns to each subgame ~
history a set of paths while a SB on SPEa ~ on profiles assigns to each subgame a set of
profiles. In order to show an equivalence between these various optimistic stable SBs,
the following definitions are required. Let o be a SB that is optimistic stable on paths
~ for the tree situation. Define a SB Eo which assigns to each subgame a set of
profiles by the property that E~(h) -{x E Xh~ ~rk(x) E o(k) for all k ~ h} if h E li`Hp.
Conversely, let E be a SB that is optimistic stable on SPEa ~ on profiles. Define a SB
oE which assigns to each subgame a set of paths by the property that oE(h) -
{a E IIh~ n- ah(x) for some x E E(h)} if h E 11`Hp (and, in the case of tree situation,
oE(h) - TI~ -{o} if h E Ho). Also, say that a SB o which assigns to each subgame ~
history a set of paths is non-empty valued if, for each h E li`N0, o(h) ~ 0.
The equivalence between the optimistic stable SBs of this section can be
established for general extensive games with perfect information subject to the
condition that the SB that is optimistic stable for the tree situation be non-empty
valued.
PROPOSIT[ON 1. For a general extensive game wáth perfect information, the
joAowáng implicatáons hold.
(a) IJ o ás a non-empty valued SB that is optimistic staóle án the tree sátuation, then
Q constraáned to 11`HD is a SB that is optimástic stable on II.
(b) 1f a ás a SB that is optimistic stable on II, then Ev is a SB that is optimistic
stable on X.
(c) If E is a SB that is optimistic stable on X, then oE is a non-empty valued SB
lhat ás optimistic stable in the tree situation.
As the following example makes clear, the assumption that o in the tree
situation be non~mpty valued is essential.Example 3. Consider the one player static game in which the player chooses
a E[0, 1) and receives a payoff U- a. Here a SB that optimistic stable on H does
not exist, neither does a SB that is optimistic stable on X. However, Q with a(0) - 0
and o(h) -{0} for each h- a E[0, 1) ia optimistic stable in the tree situation.
For a game with perfect information that is either a Strotz-Pollak game or a
continuous game, a strategy profile is a SPE if and only if no one-shot deviation is
profitable. For games in this class that are finite action, the optimistic stable SB of
Section 2 can be included in the equivalence.
PHOPOSITION 'l. I'or ara cxtcnsive game with p~~rji~rl ir~jortnaliart llaal is rilhcr a
.Slmh-Pnllnk gam~~ or n ~onl.innons gnme, Ili.r jnllo~nira.q implécation halds.
(c'J 1j E is a SB that is optimistic staóle on X, then ~, is a SB with E(0) ~ 0 that
is optimistic stable on X~,.
Foran extensive game with perfecl injormation that is either a~nite action game or, jor
ench subgame, has a unique SPE, the jollowing implication holds.
(c'J Ij E is a SB with E(0) ~ 0 thnt is optimistic stable on XE, then aE is a non-
empty valued SB that is optimistic slable in the tree situalion.
As the following example shows, if an extensive game is ncither of the Strotz-
Pollak variety nor continuous, the first implication of Proposition 2 may not hoW.
Exnmple 4. (Greenberg, 1990, Example 8.2.5) There are two players, 1 and 2,
who each can choose, in his turn, two actions. Player 1 can choose either U or D,
and playcr 2 can choosc cithcr l, or R. 'furns are altcrnal,ing, with playcr I bcing thc
onc to start.. llence, TI -{(a(1), ... , a(t), ...) ~ a(l) E{ U, D} if t is odd and
a(t) E{L, R} i[ t is even}. 'lhe paths in 11 yield the [ollowing payoffs:
U(~r) (:- ( Ut(~r), UZ(a))) - (5, 0) if a E H and, for all a E{ U, D, G, R}, a is playedinfinitely many times. U(x) - (0, 5) if a E H and, for some a E { U, D, L, R}, a is
played finitely many times. Here, II~- {a[ (h, a) E II and U(h, ~r) - (0, 5)} since
player 2 can individually force the payoff profile (0, 5), e.g. by always playing L;
hence H~``IIÉ -{a[ (h, x) E H and U(h, a) -(5, 0)}. As shown by Greenberg (1990,
Example 8.2.5), the SBs o~ defined by o~(h) - IIÉ for all h E H and a2 defined by
az(h) - IIh`IIÉ for all h E H are each optimistic stable in the tree situation. By
Proposition 1, the SBs Eat and Eo2 are each optimistic stable on profiles. However,
Ea2 is not even a SB on SPEa since Eo2(0) is disjoint from the set of SPEa.
As the following example shows, if an extensive game is neither finite action nor
has a unique SPE in each subgame, the second implication of Proposition 2 may not
hold.
Example 5. Consider a two player game in which player 1 at the initial node 0
can end the game by choosing A(yielding the payoff profile (1, 1)) or continue the
game by choosing B E[0, 2). In the latter circumstance, player 2 has the choice
between L (yielding the payoff profile (B, 0)) or R (yielding the payoff profile
(-B, 0)). This game has a unique (pure strategy) SPE in which 1 plays A and 2- if
called - plays R. Hence, the unique E that is optimistic stable on SPEa has E(0) -
X~, ~ 0 and, for each B E [0, 2), E(B) - XÉ -{L, R}. However, the unique a that is
optimistic stable in the tree situation has o(0) - 0 and, for each B E[0, 2),
o(B) -{L, R}, a(B, L) -{0}, and o(B, R) - {0}.5. A REVISION-PROOF PLAN
The concept that thia paper suggests in order to solve the Strotz-Pollak problem
of consistent planning will be referred to as a revision-proof ptan. When an optimal
and time consistent path (or decision rule) does not exist, the individual need know
what he will do at the next stage under the different contingencies that his various
actions now will givc rise to. Ilence, interpreting a revision-prcxrf plan as a path is not.
informationally simpler for the individual than interpreting a revision-proof plan as a
strategy profile in the Strotz-Pollak game. For, in order to determine such a time
consistent path, he needs to determine the set of time consistent paths in every
subgame. Hence, two alternative and (due to Proposition 1) equivalent definitions will
be offered.
DEFINIT[ON 1. (Asheim, 1987) In a Strotz-Pollak game C, a E H is a revision-
proofpath if there exists a SB o, with a E o(0), that is optimistic stable on fl.
DEFINITION 2. In a Strotz-Pollak game C, 2 E X is a revision-proof equi-
librium if there exists a SB E, with x E E(0), that is optimistic stable on X.
The following two wrollaries establish inter alia the equivalence of DeGnitions 1
and `l and, mormver, that thc~e definitions yield a refinement of Subgarno-perfecaness.
COROLLARY 1. (a) In a Strotz-Pollak game G, ij ~r is a revision-proof path,
then there exists a revision-proof equilibrium z with a~(x) - rr. (b) In a Strotz-Pollak
game C, a is a revision-proof path if and only if there e2ist a non-empty valued SB a,
wíth x E o(0), that is optimistic slaóle tin lhe tree situation. (c) In aSlrolz-Pollak game
G, if a is a revision-proof path, then rr E HE.COROLLARY 2. (a) In a Strot~-Pollak game C, if z is a revision-proojequi-
libréum, then ~r~(x) is a revision-proof path. (b) In a finite action Strotx-Pollak gnme
C, z is a revision-proojequilibrium if and only if there ezist a SB E, urith zE E(0),
that is optimistic stable on XE. (c) In a Strotz-Pollnkgame C, if x is a revision-proof
equílibrium, then z E XE.
The relation between the concept of Definitions 1 and 2 and the set of optimal
and time consistent paths when this set is non~mpty is established in the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. (i) If x is a revision-proof path in the Strotz-Pollak game G
and there ezists an optimal and time consistent path p, then U~(~r) - U~(p) jor i- 1.
(ii) If there ezists a non-empty set of optimal and time consistent paths in each subgame
oj the Strotz-Pollak game G, then ~r is a revision-proof path if and only ij a is
optimal and time consistent.
By part (ii), it follows that in Example 1(of Section 2) the unique revision-proof path
is ( U, D), while in Example 2 (of Section 2) the unique revision-proof path is
(1, 1, 1, ...). Hence, the concept of Definitions 1 and 2 yields the satisfactory solution
in these examples. See also Asheim ( 1987, 1988a) for an analysis of a game where
Subgame-perfectness by allowing any feasible path has no bite, but where the
application of Definition 1 successfully solves the problem of consistent planning.
In spite of the argument of Section 2, viz. that the Strotz-Pollak problem of
consistent planning is not solved by the concept of Subgame-perfectness, Subgame-
perfectness is in accordance with Strotz-Pollak planning under the condition of the
following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4. !f there ezists a unique SPE in each subgnme oj the Strotz-Pollnk game G, then the unique a E H~, is the unique rerrision-proojpath, and the
unique z E XE is the unique revision-proojequilibrium.
Example 1(of Section 'l) would satisfy the condition o[ Proposition 4 if player 2 were
not indifferent between U and D at time 2.
On the question of existence of a revision-proof path~equilibrium, Greenberg
(1990, Corollary 8.3.2) combined with Proposition 1 yields the following result.
PROPOSIT1oN 5. In a hnite horizon, finite action Strot,r-PoUak gnme G, there
ezists a unique SB a that is optimistic stable on H. Furthermore, o is non-emply
valued.
Peleg and Yaari (1973, Section III) presents an example for which they claim that no
solution to the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning exists. Even though their
example is not covered by Proposition 5 above, it is straight-forward to show that t,lic
SPE that Goldman (1980, note 4) constructs for this example is in fact a revision-proof
equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2. However, the following example illustrates the
case o( a finite horizon, compact action garne with continuous payoffs for which Lhere
exists no revision-proof path~equilibrium.
Example 6. (Hellwig and Leininger, 1987, Section III) Consider a three player
Strotz-Pollak game, where íor each i E{1, 2, 3}, a~ E[0, 1], and where Ul --n3 - a~,
U2 - a3 t ía2, and U3 - a3(' - al - a2) - a3(1 - a3). Hellwig and Leininger (1987)
show that the uniquc SPE path is (~, 1, 0). Ilowcvcr, in thc subgamc h- a~ -„
there is a unique revision-proof path (0, 1) which yields player 2 a higher payofí than
continuing the SPE path. Hence, the unique SPE path is not revision-proof. Note that
if the action sets are turned into discrete grids, the unique revision-proof path is
(}te, 1, 0) for some e ~ 0.6. RENEGOTIATION-PROOFNESS AS COLLECT[VE TIME CONSISTENCY
In a repeated game, a SPE can be supported by a threat which - if called - is
Pareto-inferior to the original SPE. Hence, if the players can coordinate before each
stage of the game, they prefer renegotiating back to the original SPE rather than
undertaking the threat. However, this undermines the credibility of the threat and
questions the viability of the original SPE. The literature on renegotiation-proof
equilibria (see e.g. Farrel and Maskin, 1989, Bernheim and Ray, 1989, Asheim, 1991,
and Pearce, 1987, as well as Bergin and MacLeod, 1991, for a survey) seeks to answer
the following question: What SPEa are not prone to this kind of criticism?
A SPh~ that is uot renegotiation-proof may be looked at as a plan that is not
collectively time consistent (see e.g. Bernheim and Ray, 1989): There are subgames
where the grand coalition as a collective gains by revising the plan. In these terms
there are obvious similarities between the Strotz-Pollak notion of consistent planning as
a problem of individual time consistency and the notion of renegotiation-proofness as a
problem of collective time consistency. There are also differences, though: In the
problem of individual time consistency the revision occurs even on the equilibrium
path, while in the problem of collective time consistency the revision (in the interesting
cases) occurs only off the equilibrium path after a deviation by one of the players.
Still, it is by now straightforwatd to show that the notion of a SB that is
optimistic stable on SPEa yields a definition of both individual and collective time
consistency. By Corollary 2(b) it is already established for (finite action) Strotz-Pollak
games that x is a revision-proof equilibrium if and only if there exists a SB E, with
x E E(0), that is optimistic stable on SPEa. What remains is to establish a
corresponding result for collective time consistency in repeated games, viz. that x is a
renegotiation-proof equilibrium if and only íf there exists a SB E, with a E E(0), that
is optimistic stable on SPEa.
First, it is necessary to spell out how repeated games fit into the general modelof Section 3. A repeated game C consists of a T-fold play of a n-person history-
indcl)cndent simultancx)us-move game, where T is finite or infinitc. Hence, Nl` - N
for all FI`Ho. Furthermore, for each i E N, A~` - A~ for all Ft`H~. Finally, Hp - AT
if T c oo and Ho - 0 if T- oo. The path a -( a(1), ... , a(T)) E A~ yields player
i the payoff Ut(a) :- T.Ei-1v~(n(t)) if Tc oo and U~(a) :- (1-b)~Ei-tÀ~-l~v~(a(t))
with á E (0, 1) if T - oo, where v~ is the stage game payoff function of player i.
Now, the following observations can be made.
PROPOSITION 6. A SPE x oj a repeated game G is a Pareto-perfect
equilibrium as defened in Defenition 1 ojAsheim (1991) ijnnd only ijthere exists a SB
~, with x E E(0), that is optimistic stable on XE.
COROLLARY 3. A SPE x of a f)nitely repeated game G where, jor each i E N,
A~ is compact and v~ is continuous is a Consislent equilibrium as defsned by Bernleeim
and IZay (1989, Section ;J) iJ and ouly iJ lhere exisls a S(3 Z, wiUi x E ~'(o), Uial is
optimistic stable on XF.
Hence, according to the usual and uncontroversial definition of renegotiation-
proofness in finitely repeated games and the extension that I(Asheim, 1991) suggest for
infinitely repeated games, renegotiation-proofness as a requirement for collective time
consistency is closely related to the Strotz-Pollak notion of consistent planning as a
requirement for individual time consistency.
In the present paper, the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning has b~n
analyzed by turning the decision tree into an extensive game where the individual at
different times corresponds to different players. An alternative would be to treat the
decision problem as a one player "game" where the evaluation of a path through the
decision tree depends on which node along the path the evaluation takes place. I have
in Asheim (1988b) presented a definition of subgame-perfectness in multi-stage gamesthat can be applied to such a one player "game", and for which it is identical to the
definition of a revision-proof equilibrium. (See also Asilis et al. (1991) for a similar
definition where Roth (1976) semi-stability is used instead of von Neumann and
Morgenstern stability). Furthermore, the non-recursive definitions of Pareto-perfect-
ness and Perfectly coalition-proofness in Asheim (1988b) reduce to the definition of
revision-proofness in such a one player "game". If the one player "game" has a finite
horizon, the recursive definition of a Perfectly coalition-proof equilibrium in Bernheim
et al. (1987, p.10) can be shown to be applicable and yielding revision-proofness.
7. CONSISTENT PLANNING IN STATIONARY STROT7,-POLLAK GAMF,S
A finite horizon Strotz-Pollak game is stationary if all subgames are isomorphic
to the game itself. Such a stationary structure is shared by infinitely repeated games.
Stationary Strotz-Pollak games therefore allow for the application of concepts of
renegotiation-proofness as developed for infinitely repeated games. Kocherlakota
(1991) has successfully applied Farrell and Maskin's (1989) concepts of weakly
renegotiation-proofand strongly renegotiation-proofequilibria, the analogs being called
symmetric and reconsideration-proofequilibria, respectively. A symmetric equilibrium
is a SPE yielding the individual the same payoff in every subgame (as evaluated at the
root of the subgame). Kocherlakota (1991) considers such symmetry a necessary condi-
tion for a time consistent plan. A symmetric equilibrium is reconsideration-proof if
there is no symmetric equilibrium yielding the individual a higher payoff, a concept for
which Kocherlakota (1991) establishes general existence. Kocherlakota (1991) a]so
shows that if an optimal and time consistent path exists, then this path is a recon-
sideration-proof path, a property that - by Proposition 3(ii) - is shared by revision-
proofness in stationary Strotz-Pollak games. The following proposition gives a result
on the relation between revision-proof.and reconsideration-proof equilibria.PROroS~T1oN 7. (Kocherlakota, private communication) In a stationary Strotz-
Pollak game, a revision-proof equilibrium is symmetric if and only if it is reconsidera-
tion-proof.
As the following example shows, it is possible to construct a stationary Strotz-
Pollak game which admits revision-proof equilibria, none of which are symmetric.
Example 7. (Kocherlakota, 1991, Example 1). Consider the stationary Strotz-
Pollak game where for each i E N, a~ E(o, 1] and U~ - E~Z~-`(a - a.tl) with
i- i i
pE (o, 1). The set of individually rational and feasible payoffs is (0, 1]. The unique
stationary SPE determines the action 1 for each player at every node. Any path
which at cach timc is individually rational (including Lhe optirnal path (l, 0, 0, ...))
can be supported as a SPE by using the stationary SPE path ( 1, 1, 1, ...) as a punish-
ment. Any syrnmetric equilibrium yields the payoff 0; hence, they are all recaisidera-
tion-proof, including the unique stationary SPE.
C[.AIM 1. For the game of F,xample 7, (i) ao - ((~, pt, ~, ...) is a revision-
proofpath, and, furthermore, (ii) no symmetric equilibrium is revision-proof.
Holden (private communication) has pointed out that Pearce's (1987) concept of
renegotiation-proofness is easily applicable to stationary Strotz-Pollak games. In
particular, let l(x) :- inf{uh(x) ~ h E H with i- i}, and say that the SPE x is a
Pearce time consistent equilibrium if there exists no SPE y such that L(x) G P(y). The
interpretation is that the individual will accept a punishment if any SPE involves as
harsh a punishment in some subgame. In Example 7, l(x) - 0 for any SPE x, so t.hat.
Pearce time consisteucy has no bite. ]n the following example, though, Pearce time
consistency picks out the reasonable paths, all of which are revision-proo[.
Exnmple 8. Consider the stationary Strotz-Pollak game where for each i E N,a~ E{0, 1} and U~ - a~ - a~tl - a~}2. The set of individually rational and feasible
payoffs is {-1, 0, 1}. The unique stationary SPE determines the action 1 for each
player at every node. Any path which at eac.h Lime is individually rational can be
supported as a SPE by using the stationazy SPE path (1, 1, 1, ...) as a punishment.
The stationazy SPE, yielding the payoff -1, is the unique symmetric equilibrium and,
hence, the unique reconsideration-proof equilibrium.
CLAIM 2. For the game of E2ample 7, (i) R~ -(0, 0, 0, ...), ~rl -(1, 0, 0, ...),
and n2 - ( 1, I, 0, 0, ...) are the Pearce time consistent paths; furthermore, (ii) a~, ai,
and a2 are all revision-prooJ and fanally, (iii) the unique symmetric equiliórium is
neither Pearce time consistent nor revision-proof.
The problem with the concept of reconsideration-proofness in the context of these
examples is that it determines as time consistent the symmetric SPEa - which all hold
the individual down to his reservation payoff - even though there exist SPEa that for
every subgame yields the individual strictly more than his reservation payoff.
Finally, note that Examples 7 and 8 each illustrates the case of a game which
allows for multiple SBs that are optimistic stable on paths~profiles.
8. A SINGLE PLANNER OR DIFFERENT INDIVIDUALS
Returning to the game of Example 1, dces it make any difference for the
solution of the game whether the game models planning by a single individual or
strategic interaction between two individuals? One difference between the two
interpretations is that a single individual faces no problems of communication, while in
multi-person games communication is in general an issue - even in perfect information
games - when there is a need to coordinate on one out of several equilibria.In the gamc of Example l, a forward induction argument (see van Damme,
1989) would say that player 1, by choosing U, can indicate his desire to play the SPE
( U, D), since his only reason for playing U would be that he expects player 2 to
choose D. Hence, by involving forward induction as a vessel of communication from
player 1 to player 2, one can argue that ( U, D) is the reasonable prediction in this
game even if the game is interpreted as modeling strategic interaction between two
individuals.
In the present game with B c 1- i.e., player 2 prefcrs the SPE (U, D) to
(D, U) - this prediction is shared by a number of recent papers (Tran~s, 1991; Pons-
sard, 1991; as well as an earlier and different approach by Leininger, 1986): Following
'franaes (1991), player 2 chaising D is then a credàble promàse that should be
anticipated by player 1 and induce him to chose U. However, with B~ 1 - i.e.,
player 2 prefers the SPE (D, i~ to ( U, D) - the above mentioned contributions as
well as Bennett and van Damme (1990) would yield the opposite prediction: Following
Bennett and van Damme (1990) and Tranaes (1991), player 2 choosing U is then a
credàble threat that should be anticipated by player 1 and induce him to chose D. The
invalidity of the forward induction argument in this case is explained by Bennett and
van Damme (1990, p. 14) as follows: In the present game with B~ 1, "... the forward
induction logic is not compelling: although player 1 may indicate his desire to play a
particular subgame perfect strategy combination, he has no means of enforcing this
strategy combination since he has no further moves in the game." Of course this
criticism of the forward induction argument is not valid if the game models planning by
a single individual since then the individual making the move of player 1 is the sarne as
the one making the move of player 2.
Hence, when thc garne is interpretcd as modeling planning by a single indi-
vidual, it is easier to defend ( U, D) as the unique solution also when B~ 1.9. TIME CONSISTENCY IN MACROECONOMIC POLICY GAMES
Starting with Kydland and Prescott (1977), there is a considerable literature on
the topic of consistent planning in the context of macroeconomic policy games. In such
games a government's (the leader's) policy - which at the outset is optimal - may
cease to be so at some later time. This may occur since the policy was designed to
induce the general public (the follower) to take specific actions. When these actions
have been irrevocably taken, the leader may wish to revise the originally planned policy
since the constraints imposed by the follower's preferences on the leader's choice set, by
then, have changed. In this literature the conclusion is that time consistency is a
weaker requirement than Subgame-perfectness (see Fershtman, 1989), which is a
conclusion seemingly in contrast with the one of the present paper. Happily, there is
no conflict since the matters treated in the present paper are different from those of
Fershtman (1989) along two dimensions.
The first dimension relates to the difference between time inconsistent
prejerences and time inconsistent constraints (see e.g. Persson and Svensson, 1989).
While Fershtman (1989) and the literature on policy games are concerned with the
time inconsistency of the constraints imposed by the follower's preferences on the
leader's choice set, the present paper as well as the Strotz-Pollak literature on
consistent planning are concerned with the time inconsistency of the planner's
preferences. I.e., the latter literature poses the problem of an individual decision maker
who wishes to revise an optimal path when his own initial actions have been
irrevocably taken since his preferences, by then, have changed.
Relating to this dimension, there is a major difference on a formal level: In a
Strotz-Pollak game, there are as many players as there are points in time at which the
individual makes decisions. In a policy game there is one leader and one (Fershtman,
1989) or a continuum (Chari and Kehce, 1990) of followers, with the leader at different
times being the same player. Hence, one should bear in mind that the two kinds ofgames are quite different when discussing the relation between Subgame-perfectness
and time consistency in each oí them.
The second dimension along which the present paper differs from Fershtman
(1989) is conveyed by letting the follower in Fershtman's (1989) framework be a trivial
player which at any of hia decision nodes can take only one action. Then Fershtman's
(1989) definition of a time consistent open loop Stackelberg equilibrium becomes
identical to the definition in the introduction to Section 2 of an optimal and time
consistent path. Similarly, Fershtman's (1989) definition of a time consistent
Stnckelberg equilibrium with decision rule strntegies becomes identical to the definition
in the introduction to Section 2 of an optimal and time consistent decision rule. Hence,
Fershtman (1989) is the analog - in the case of time inconsistent constraints - to a
definition of an optimal and time consistent path (or decision rule): In order to
establish whether a path (or decision rule) is optimal and time consistent, it suffices to
check along the (generated) path.
A deCnition of time consistency when the optimal (wrninitrnent) policy is nut
time consistent is given by Chari and Kehoe (1990) for the case of an infinite horizon
economy. In their model, time consistency constitutes a refinement of Subgame-
perfectness for a totally different reason than that of the present paper: The followers
are modeled as a continuum of competitive and anonymous private agents, each with
his private history, so that the only proper subgame is the original game itsel(.
Therefore, Subgame-perfectness does not imply sequential rationality. Chari and
Kehce's (1990) sustainnble plans allow for the use of trigger strategies, implying that
the government - after a deviation - may wish to let bygones be bygoncs by
announcing a revised policy whereby it escapes the punishment. In a policy game, such
trigger strategies are defendable, however, since the general public may not believe the
government's pledge that no new deviation will occur subsequently. Such an issue of
confidence dces not arise when analyzing the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent
planning by an individual with time inconsistent preferences.10. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the present paper the Strotz-Pollak notion of consistent planning - viz. that
the individual should choose "the best plan among those he will actually follow" - has
been given a precise meaning. The concept of a revision-proof path~equilibrium as
introduced here is implicitly contained in the work of Greenberg (1990, Ch. 8). The
present contribution gives this concept interpretations that are more closely related to
the problem that Strotz (1955-56) originally posed.
It is a conclusion of this paper that - when analyzing the problem of consistent
planning through an extensive game where the individual at different times corresponds
to separate players (a 'Strotz-Pollak game') - a revision-proof equilibrium is a
refinement of Subgame-perfectness. This conclusion contrasts the literature on time
consistency in policy games (see e.g. Fershtman, 1989); however, as argued in Section
9, the matters treated in this paper are different from those of Fershtman (1989).
A general mode] of an extensive game of almost perfect information has been
introduced in Section 3, yielding the Strotz-Pollak game and the repeated game as
special cases. Through this framework it has been possible to capture consistent
planning as a requirement for individual time consistency and renegotiation-proofness
as a requirement for collective time consistency through the same general concept, viz.
a SB that is optimistic stable on SPEa.
Extensive games that are neither repeated nor of the Strotz-Pollak variety have
not been explicitly analyzed. Applying the concept of a SB that is optimistic stable on
SPEa to, e.g., Example 1 of van Damme (1989) would convince the reader that this
concept in some instances captures a notion of forward induction. A discussion of
forward induction in such games is, however, outside the scope of the present paper.
Note, though, Al-Najjar (1991) for an analysis of forward induction in a framework that
is related to the present one.11. PROOFS
The observations of the following two lemmas will turn out to be useful.
LEMMA l. Let G 6e a game with perject information, and let E be a SB jor C
that is optimistie stable on XE, on X. Then z E E(h) implies xk E E(k) jor any
k ~ h.
Proof. Let y E Xt`. Suppose yk if E(k) for some k? h. By (ES), there exist
k~ k and z E E(k') such that uk (z) ~ uk (y) for i- i. By (IS), y~ E(h) since
k~h. a
Lcnuna I iniplics thc following corollary.
COROLLARY 4. Get C 6e a game with perject injormntion, and lel E 6e a SB
jor C that is optimistic stable on XE ~ on X. Then ~r E oE(h) implies a' E oE(k) iJ
k is reachable from h through a and (h, x) -(k, ~r').
LEMMA 2. Let C 6e a game with perject injorynation, and lel a be a SB jor G
that is optimistic stable on II ~ in the tree situation. Then ~r E a(h) implies x' E o(k)
ij k is renchaóle from h through x and (h, a) -(k, a').
Proof. Let e E IIt`. Suppose p' ~ o(k) where k is reachable from h through
a and (h, P) -(k, p'). liy (I;S), therc cxists k' aud A E a(k') such that A ~ l~k') is
reachable from k through p' and U~(k, p') c U~(k', a) for i - ik ~[or
(IS), p~ o(h) since l: ~ P(k') is reachable from h through p. o
Lemma 2 implies the following corollary.
s - tPlt` l. I~Y
COROLLARY 5. Let C be a game urith perject injormation, and let o 6e a non-
empty valued SB jor G that is optimistic stabte on II ~ in the tree situation. Then, jor
any hE ll`IIO, o(h) -(at`(z)~ aE ~a(h)}.Proof of Proposition l. (a) (o constrained to fl`Ho is optimistic internally
stable on If.) By (IS) and Lemma 2, for any h E!i`HO, all paths in o(h) yields i
the same payoff. The optimistic internal stability on II follows from Lemma 2. (o
constrained to FI`fl~ is optimistic externally stable on II.) By (ES), aE IIh`o(h)
implies that there exist k E H and p E o(k) such that P(k) is reachable from h
through ~r and U~(h, rr) c U~(k, p) for i- iP~~l. Since o is non~mpty valued, by
(IS), there exists p' E v(P(k)) such that U~(k, p) S U.(P(k), p') for i- i~kl. The
optimistic external stability on II follows since U~(h, a) c U~(P(k), p') for i- i~~`l.
(b) (o is non~mpty valued.) Suppose o(h) - 0. Consider any n E Il~`. By (ES),
there exists k E ff`H~ reachable from h through ~r such that o(k) ~ 0. Let k be
the first such node, and let p E o(k). Then, by (ES), P' E a(h) where (h, p') -(k, p).
(Eo is optimistic internally stable on X.) By (IS), for any h E fl`Ho, all paths in
o(h) yields i the same payoff. The optimistic internal stability on X follows from
the definition of Ea. (E~ is optimistic externally stable on X.) If x E Xh`Ea(h),
then for some k ~ h, nk(x) ~ Q(k). By (ES), there exists k' E li`HO reachable from k
through ak(x) and p E o(k') such that (u~` (x) -) U.(k, rrk(x)) ~ U~(k', p) for i- i.
Since a is non~mpty valucd, by Corollary 5, there exists y E E~(k') with rrk (y) - p.
The optimistic external stability on X follows since k' ? h.
(c) (aE is non-empty valued.) Suppose E(h) - 0. By Lemma 1, there exists x E Xh
with xk E E(k) for all k? h such that E(k) ~ 0. Then, by (ES), x E E(h). (oE is
optimistic internally stable in the tree situation.) By (IS), for any h E E!`Ho, all
paths in oE(h) yields ih the same payoff. Suppose, for some h E fl`Ho, ~r E aE(h),
and there exist k E H and p E oE(k) such that P(k) is reachable from h through ~r
and U~(h, ~r) ~ U~(k, P) for i- i~kl. Construct y E XP~k~ such that
(P(k), ~r~kl(y)) -(k, p) and y~~k~' "~ E E(P(k), a) for all n E A~k~. Since, by
Corollary 4, for all x E E(P(k)), u~kl(x) - U~(h, a) ~ U~(k, p) - u~k~(y) for i- i~k~,
by (ES), y E E(P(k)). However, this contradicts (IS). (aE is optimistic externally
stable in the tree situation.) If ~r E II~``aE(h), there exists k E H and p E vE(k) suchthat P(k) is reachable from h through a and U~(h, a) c U~(k, p) for i- ip(kl.
Because otherwise, by (ES) and Lemma 1, there exists z E E(h) - with Ah(z) - a and
zk chosen arbitrarily in E(k) for all k E FI`Ha such that k' is not, but P(k) is
reachable from h though x- implying that x E oE(h). o
ProojojProposition 2. (c') (E(0) ~ 0.) Follows from the proof of Proposition
1(c). (E is optimistic stable on XE.) Suppose zE L(h) is not a SPE. For the class
of games considered, there exists a one-shot deviation (w.l.o.g.) at h to y E Xh
(where y~ - x~ for i~ i) that is profitable for i. By (IS), y~ Z(h), but
yk - zk E E(k) for all k~ h. By (ES), there exists x E E(h) with (uh(z) G) u~`(y) c
u~(x) for i- i. However, this contradicts (IS) since z E E(h). Hence, for each
h E FI`Ho, E(h) C XF~`„ and E is optimistic stable on X~.
(c') (oE is non-empty valued.) Follows from the definition of aE since E(o) ~ 0.
(oE is optimistic internally stable in the tree situation.) By (IS), for any h E FI`HO,
all paths in aE(h) yields i the same payofí. Suppose, for some h E FI`llo,
~r E oE(h), and there exist k E H and p E oE(k) such that P(k) is reachable from h
through x and U~(h, a) G U~(k, p) for i- iplkl. For the class of games considered,
there exists y E XÉ k~ maximizing u~t`1(y'), i- i~kl, over all y' E X~k~ with
ak(y') - p and y'IPfkl' "1 - x(a) E E(P(k), a) for all a E At~kl. 5ince, by Corollary 4,
for all zE ~(P(k)), u~~`1(T) - Il~(h, a) c ll~(k, p) S nPlkl(y) for i- iIkl, bY (1';s),
y E E(P(k)). However, this contradicts (IS). (aE is optimistic externally stable in the
tree situation.) If x E IIE`a~(h), there exists k E H and p E o~(k) such thaL f'(k) is
reachable from h through a and U(h, ~r) ~ U~(k, p) for i- i~k1. Because
otherwise, by (ES) and Lemma I, there exists x E L(h) - with ~rh(z) - ~r and xk
chosen arbitrarily in E(k) for all k E fl`Ho such that k' is not, but P(k) is
reachable from h though ~r - implying that x E aE(h). If a E H~`II~` ~„ there exists
k E H such that P(k) is reachable from h through a and, tor all p E TI~„
11~(h, ~r) G ll~(k, p) for i - i~kl. Bccausc othcrwisc, thcrc cxist.s x E.~'~, - withx~`(x) - ~r and xk E X~ satisfying U~(h, A) ? U(k', ak (x)) for t- iP~k f for all
k E fl`Ho such that k' is not, but P(k) is reachable from h though a - implying
that RE II~ The optimistic external stability in the tree situation follows since, for
each h E H, 0~ oE(h) c Il~ o
Proof of Corollary 1. (a) Proposition 1. (b) Proposition 1. (c) Proposition 1(b)
and 2(c'). o
Proof of Corollary 2. (a) Proposition 1. (b) Propositions 1 and 2. (c) Proposi-
tion 2(c'). o
Proof ofProposition 3. (i) Since a Strotz-Pollak path exists, there exists a SB o
that is optimistic stable on II. By (ES), P E a(0) since there do not exist h E H`Ho
reachable from 0 through ~r and P' E II~` ~ o(h) such that U~(p) ~ U~(h, p') for
i- i. By (IS), U~(~r) - Ut(p) for i- i- 1. (ái) Define the SB o on II by, for each
h E fi`Ho, o(h) -{~r E IIti~ a is optimal and time consistent}. Let o' be any SB that
is optimistic stable on II. If rr E Q(h), there do not exist k E ti`HO reachable from h
through a and p E II~` ~ a(k) such that U(h, n) c U~(k, p) for i- i~`. Hence, Q
satisfiicw (IS), and by (F.S) of o', for each h E Il`Ho, a(h) C v'(h). If n E II~`a(h),
then there exist k E tl`Ho reachable from h through ~r and p E v(k) C o-'(k) such
that U~(h, ~r) ~ U~(k, p) for i- ik. Hence, o satisfies (ES), and by (IS) of v', for
each h E II~Ho, a(h) 7 o'(h). a
Proof of Proposition 4. Trivially, E defined by, for each h E fi`Ho,
E(h) - X~ is the unique SB that is optimistic stable on XE, The result follows from
Propositions 1 and 2. o
ProojojProposition 6. Follows directly from Definition 1 of Asheim (1990). o
ProofoJCorollary 3. Proposition 1 of Asheim (1990). aProofof Proposition 7. Suppose that some symmetric revision-proof equilibrium
y is not reconsideration-proof. Then there exists a symmetric equilibrium z' such
that u~(y) c uo(x'). Sincc y is revision-proof, there exists a S13 ?.', with y E s.'(0),
that is optimistic stable on X. Ry (TS) of E, x' E J11E(o). Ry ( I;S) of E, there exist
h E H and x E E(h) such that ( ua(y)) C u~(x') c uh(x) for í - i. `I'his contradicts
(IS) of E. Hence, if a revision-proof equilibrium is symmetric, then it is
reconsideration-proof. The converse is trivial. o
Proof of Claim 1. (i) Consider the class of paths {x~}, j E N, where ~
consists of the play of 1 j times, followed by ~r~. The first j plays of ~ is ca,lled
the stationary phase; i.e., the last play of 1-,13e is part of the non-stationary phasc.
Construct the following strategy profile r Start with a~. Deviation from the
stationary phase of x~ is not punished; deviation from ~ when ~ prescribes the
play of ,0~ , j' E {0, 1, 2, ...}, triggers x' . This determines a unique path á~ - ~rh( z)
in each subgame h E H. Let o be defined by o(h) -{~rh} for all h E H. Part (i)
follows if o is optimistic stable on H. The (IS) of o is trivial. In order to establish
(ES), suppose p E Ilh`o(h) - Hh`{ir~`} and there dces not exist k E H reachable from
It Lhrough p such that U~(h, p) G U~(k, à~) fur i- iE. If p dilfcrs fruiu ir~` unly
during the stationary phase of xh, then U~(h, p) c U~(h, ir~`) - U~(k, irk) for i- i
where k is the last node at which p differs from irh. Therefore, p diffcrs from á~
during the non~tationary phase of ~rl`. Let the first deviation during the non-
stationary phase occur when ~rh prescribes the play of a. Let h' denote the node
following this deviation such that the deviation occurs at P(h'). Let (h, p) -(h', p').
Then p' E III` `{irh } because otherwise U(h', p') ~ Q. U~(P(h'), irPl~`1) for i- i~h l.
Furthermore, there exists k' reachable from h' through p' such that U~(k, ir~ )-
1~(lt~) for i- i. By induction, this leads to a contradiction since ~m, U,(h, p) S
; -~ ~
I~(1-p), where i- i, and establishes (ES) of a.
(ii) Let y be a symmetric equilibrium. Suppose there exist a SB E, withy E E(0), that is optimistic stable on X. By (IS) of E, i E X`E(0). By (ES) of E,
there exist h E H and x E E(h) such that (u~`(y)) c ub(ï) c u~`(x) for i- i. This
contradicta (IS) of E, establishing that no such optimistic stable E exists. o
Proojof Claim 2. (i) Construct the strategy profiles x~, j- 0, 1, 2, as follows:
Start with ~. Deviation from ~ when ~ prescribes the play of 1 is not punished;
deviation írom ~ when ~ prescribes the play of 0 triggers ~r2. Note that xo, xl,
and xZ are all SPEa, and that ~ro, al, and a2 are the only feasible paths that yield
all players along the paths a payoff of at least 0.
(ii) Let o~, j- 0, 1, 2, be deFined by a~(h) -{a~`(x~)} for all h E K Pazt (ii)
follows if a~, j- 0, 1, 2, are optimistic stable on II. The (IS) of oa is trivial. In
order to establish (ES), assume p E II~` and there does not exist k E H reachable from
h through p such that U~(h, p) c U~(k, Ak(x~) for i- i. Let h' be reachable from
h through p with rrh (x~) - al. Let (h, p) -(h', p'). Then p' -(1, 0, 0, n, a, ...)
since al yields player i the payoff 1. If h' ~ h, this in turn implies that
(h, p) -(P(h'), (1, p')) since a~~ ~(í~) - n2 yielding player i~~ ~ the payoff 0.
What remains is to show that p' - Ac if a~`~(x~ - x~ and (h, p) -(h', p'). Suppose
k is the first node reachable from h' through p' at which p' differs from ~ro; i.e.,
i- i plays 1 instead of 0. Then it follows from the above that -1 - U~(h', p')
~ U~(k', ~rk (x~)) - 0 for i- i, which establishes (ES) of a~, j- 0, 1, 2.
(iii) Proof of Claim 1(ii) with i- z', j E {0, 1, 2}. oREFERENCES
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